AMENDED COMPLAINT submitted by LISA, JAMES, R of JAMES R LISA ESQ on behalf of LUCY AYOUB against JUSTIN A BALKIN, VANGUARD SOLUTIONS,LLC October 23, 2022 (2024)

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Ruling

Robert Bradford vs. KEITH STONE

Aug 23, 2024 |C23-03214

C23-03214CASE NAME: ROBERT BRADFORD VS. KEITH STONE*HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: APPLICATION FOR DGFS BTWN MUNDY AND BRADFORDFILED BY: MUNDY, PETER K.*TENTATIVE RULING:*Defendant and Cross-Defendant Peter K. Mundy, individually and dba Peters & Ross [Mundy] bringsthis Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement [Motion] pursuant to Code of Civil Proceduresection 877.6 [CCP 877.6]. The Motion is opposed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant K.B. StoneDiamond Corporation dba Diamond Construction [K.B.].For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.Background SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 08/23/2024This matter arises from construction defect allegations, including cracking in the walls, foundationdefects, and soils movement, and other defects throughout Plaintiffs’ single family residence.(Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 23-24.) Mundy was the geotechnical engineer that performed investigation andprovided recommendations as to the soil conditions at the residence. (Complaint, ¶ 6; Declaration ofPeter Mundy.) K.B. is the general contractor for the work at issue. (Complaint, ¶ 21.)Mundy and Plaintiffs reached a settlement for the remaining policy limits on Mundy’s burning limitspolicy, but not less than $975,000. (Declaration of Trevor McCann, ¶ 9.) Mundy presents declarationsof party, expert and counsel in support of the Motion with respect to the status of the claim and theTech-Bilt factors. Mundy’s expert, Alan Kropp declares that based on his investigation it is his opinionthat Mundy met with his standard of care, implying that Mundy does not have exposure for Plaintiffs’claims. (Declaration of Alan Kropp, ¶¶ 4-6.) The declarations submitted by Mundy do not address theestimated amount of Plaintiffs’ damages or further address the ballpark of Mundy’s exposure for suchclaims.K.B. opposes the Motion arguing that the proposed settlement is outside the ballpark of Mundy’spotential liability. The declaration of counsel for K.B. calculates that the proposed settlementaccounts for 14 percent of Plaintiffs’ estimated $7,000,000 in damages. (Declaration of ToddSchaeffer, ¶ 7.) K.B.’s counsel declares plainly that Mundy “could be” responsible for up to 100percent of Plaintiff’s damages. (Ibid.) K.B. does not present evidence to support the contention thatMundy’s scope of work is solely responsible for all of the alleged defects or discuss the basis for thecontention that this settlement is outside the ballpark of Mundy’s realistic share of liability.StandardIn an action alleging claims against multiple joint tortfeasors, a party may seek a good faithsettlement determination under CCP 877.6(a) which, if granted, generally bars any claims forcontribution and indemnity by other joint tortfeasors against the settling party. (Code Civ. Proc. §877.6(a)(1) and (c).) The criteria for a determination of good faith settlement is set forth in Tech-Bilt,Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488 [Tech-Bilt], and includes six nonexclusivefactors: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability;(2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) therecognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after atrial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance limits of settling defendants; and, (6) the existence offraud, collusion, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of non-settling defendants. (38Cal.3d at 499.)A party asserting that a settlement was reached in bad faith bears the burden of proof ofdemonstrating bad faith. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 877.6 (d); Schultz v. Super. Ct. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d250, 252.) The party seeking a determination of a good faith settlement is only required to present a"barebones" motion, which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 08/23/2024sets forth a brief background of the case. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.) “[CCP] Section 877, then, requires that the settling codefendant … makesome attempt to place the price of his settlement within a reasonable range of his relative share ofthe liability.” (Torres v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 499, 507.) In response, a partyasserting that a settlement was in bad faith bears the burden of proof of demonstrating that thesettlement is “so far out of the ballpark in relation to [the Tech-Bilt] factors as to be inconsistent withthe equitable objectives of the statute.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 877.6 (d); Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at499-500; North County Contractor's Assn. v. Touchstone Ins. Services (1994) 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085,1091; Schultz v. Super. Ct. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 250, 252.)Trial courts have “broad discretion in determining whether a settlement was entered in good faithand within the Tech-Bilt ballpark.” (Norco Delivery Service, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, Inc.(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 955, 962.) Ultimately, for the Court to grant the Motion, the “settlement figuremust not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement,would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, at p. 499) “[B]ad faith is notestablished by a showing that a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fairshare.” (Id. at 491.) “Even where the claimant's damages are obviously great, and the liability thereforcertain, a disproportionally low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relativelyinsolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.” (Ibid.)The court is entitled to rely on its judicial experience in assessing the good faith of the settlementamount. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 968.) The court shouldreasonably consider whether the evidence before it shows that the settlement accounts for allavailable coverage. (See North County Contractor's Assn., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 1094, citing Countyof Los Angeles v. Guerrero (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1157-1158 [settlor's modest financialcondition and insurance policy limits overrode the other factors]; Schmid v. Superior Court (1988) 205Cal.App.3d 1244, 1246 [finding settlement for policy limits in good faith].)AnalysisIn support of the Tech-Bilt factors, Mundy submits declarations, which present evidence that (1) theconstruction defect claims center on cracks in the walls, (2) Mundy was the geotechnical consultantfor the project and is implicated in such claims, (2) Mundy has a $1,000,000 policy that applies to thisclaim and the policy limits are diminished by defense fees and costs incurred, (3) Plaintiffs will receiveMundy’s remaining policy limits, in no event less than $975,000, and (4) Mundy worked to resolve thedefects prior to litigation and reached settlement shortly after the case was filed.In response, the declaration of K.B.’s counsel states that Plaintiffs seek $7,000,000 in damages andMundy’s settlement is approximately 14 percent of such amount. K.B. presents no expert declarationor other evidence of allocation to argue that Mundy’s settlement is outside the Tech-Bilt ballpark. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 08/23/2024This court notes from the Complaint that there are no allegations of punitive damages against Mundy,and Plaintiffs allege damages “in no event less than $6,500,000 plus interest.”This court recognizes that Mundy presented evidence of the extent of his solvency and the limitationon available his liability insurance proceeds. Clearly, Mundy has made efforts to maximize amountsavailable for settlement. The Complaint and the declaration of counsel establish that Mundy’ssettlement is 14 percent of the $7,000,000 Plaintiffs seek in damages. The Complaint and declarationssubmitted in support and opposition of this Motion establish Plaintiffs’ claims implicate Mundy’swork. Mundy’s expert declaration states that he met with his standard of care and is not liable forPlaintiffs’ damages.K.B. argues that Mundy has liability based on the report Mundy prepared for Plaintiffs. (Declaration ofTodd Schaeffer, ¶¶ 5-7.) K.B. presents no evidence that Mundy did not meet his standard of care withrespect to his scope of work for the project. K.B.’s declaration of counsel does not present evidenceto support the allocation of 100 percent liability to Mundy or discuss defendants’ actual exposure forPlaintiffs’ damages. K.B. does not present an expert declaration to support its opposition. As such,K.B. presents no credible evidentiary basis to support its argument that this policy limits settlementon a wasting limits policy is outside the ballpark of Mundy’s exposure or otherwise in bad faith.Accordingly, K.B. has not met its burden to demonstrate that Mundy’s policy limits settlement is inbad faith.The amounts offered by Mundy for settlement are almost $1,000,000, undeniably a significantamount for repair or even for construction of a single family home. Disapproval of the good faith ofthe settlement would require defendant to continue his defense, at the expense of policy limitsotherwise available for settlement, opening himself to further personal exposure and evenbankruptcy. We see no virtue in this. (See Schmid, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at 1249.)After considering the potential exposure to defendants for this claim, Mundy’s scope of work,insurance limits available for Mundy’s liability, the financial declaration by Mundy, and the settlementamount to be paid, this court determines that Mundy’s settlement is in good faith pursuant to CCP877.6 (a) and Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal. 3d at 499.CCP 877.6, subpart (c) provides: “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in goodfaith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settlingtortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity,based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” This bar includes disguised claims forindemnity or contribution, including direct claims that seek only to recover derivative damages.(Norco Delivery Service, Inc., supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at 964, citing Cal-Jones Properties v. Evans PacificCorp. (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 324, 327-328.) CCP 877.6 does not bar direct claims by Plaintiffs. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: GINA DASHMAN HEARING DATE: 08/23/2024Accordingly, pursuant to this court’s good faith settlement determination and CCP 877.6 (c), any andall actual or potential claims in this action against Mundy for equitable comparative contribution orpartial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault by otherjoint tortfeasor or co-obligor are barred.

Ruling

MARISELA VASQUEZ, ET AL. VS HAVEN WARNER CENTER, ET AL.

Aug 29, 2024 |21STCV20276

Case Number: 21STCV20276 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 40 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 40 MARISELA VASQUEZ; ANTHONY IXTA, a minor, by Marisela Vasquez as his guardian ad litem; ANABELLE IXTA, a minor, by Marisela Vasquez as her guardian ad litem; LUNA VASQUEZ, a minor, by Marisela Vasquez as her guardian ad litem; MANUEL VASQUEZ, a minor, by Marisela Vasquez as his guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs, v. HAVEN WARNER CENTER; FPI MANAGEMENT, INC.; LISA NGUYEN; DENNIS TREADAWAY; REGINA JASINKSI; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 21STCV20276 Hearing Date: 8/29/24 Trial Date: 8/26/25 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendants Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses from Manuel Vasquez, by and through his Guardian ad litem Marisela Vasquez, and Request for Sanctions [CRS # 2254] Defendants Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses from Luna Vasquez, by and through her Guardian ad litem Marisela Vasquez, and Request for Sanctions [CRS # 3297] Defendants Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses from Anthony Ixta, by and through his Guardian ad litem Marisela Vasquez, and Request for Sanctions [CRS # 0861] Defendants Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses from Anabelle Ixta, by and through her Guardian ad litem Marisela Vasquez, and Request for Sanctions [CRS # 8996] Background This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff Marisela Vasquez and her four children, Anthony Ixta, Anabelle Ixta, Luna Vasquez, and Manuel Vasquez, (Plaintiffs) allege they were injured because of bedbug bites they sustained while living in the apartment complex owned by Defendant FPI Management. (Compl. at p.1, 27-28.) On September 12, 2023, Defendant FPI Management, Inc. (FPI) delivered Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, Requests for Admission, and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiffs. (Karim Decl., Exh. A.) On November 28, 2023, Plaintiffs served responses to the same. (Karim Decl., Exh. B.) In January 2024, FPIs counsel attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiffs counsel regarding deficiencies in the provided responses. (Karim Decl., ¶ 4-10.) On January 17, 2024, FPI filed a Motion to Compel Further Responses to Written Discovery. (Karim Decl., ¶ 10.) At the Case Management Conference on January 19, 2024, the Court ordered the parties to proceed with an Informal Discovery Conference. (Karim Decl., ¶ 11.) In February, Plaintiffs served further discovery responses, which FPI alleges still contained deficiencies. (Karim Decl., Exh. C.) During the March Informal Discovery Conference, the Court ordered the parties to continue to meet and confer. (Karim Decl., ¶ 13.) Subsequently, FPI made several attempts to meet and confer with Plaintiffs counsel. (Karim Decl., ¶ 14-17.) Plaintiffs provided further amended responses in May (Karim Decl., ¶ 18.) FPI alleges these responses contained the same deficiencies. (Karim Decl., ¶ 19.) FPI has made several attempts to meet and confer since but has received no response. (Karim Decl., ¶ 19-22.) FPI moved to compel Plaintiffs Manuel Vasquez (Manuel), Luna Vasquez (Luna), Anthony Ixta (Anthony) and Anabelle Ixta (Anabelle) to provide further responses to FPIs Special Interrogatories, Requests for Admission, Set One, and Requests for Production of Documents. FPI also requests sanctions against Plaintiffs for $5,900.00. Plaintiffs have not filed any response, despite facially valid proofs of service attached to each motion and supporting papers. Because the motions are essentially identical, they are each subject to the same analysis, below. Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses Legal Standard Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300, § 2031.310, and § 2033.290 provide for a party to bring a motion to compel further responses to Interrogatories, Requests for Production, or Requests for Admission where the responding party provides inadequate, incomplete, or evasive responses, or the objections are too general or without merit. The propounding party must submit a declaration under Code of Civil Procedure § 2016.040 stating facts demonstrating a good faith and reasonable effort to informally resolve all issues raised by the motion. Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300(b); § 2031.310(b)(2); § 2033.290(b). The motion must be brought within 45 days of service of the responses or supplemental responses. Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300(c); § 2031.310(c); § 2033.290(c). Sanctions are mandatory against the party or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further unless the party acted with substantial justification or the circ*mstances make imposition of sanctions unjust. Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300(d); § 2031.310(h); § 2033.290(d). Analysis Procedural Defects The Court notes that the single motion submitted should have been submitted as separate motions, one for the interrogatories, one for the requests for admission, and one for the further production of documents. While there is no specific provision of law that, in so many words, requires separate motions for each, motions under Code of Civil Procedure § 2030.300, § 2031.310, and § 2033.290 each require separate statements under California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345. Code of Civil Procedure § 1003 provides: Every direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment, is denominated an order. An application for an order is a motion. Since the granting of the current motion would necessarily require three orders (one for each discovery device), it is seeking to combine three motions into one. Nonetheless, because of the four plaintiffs, this would result in some 12 motions, which likely would all have been heard over the course of several weeks if not months. Accordingly, except to the extent there is any prejudice to the plaintiffs, the Court will overlook this procedural defect. However, the notice of motion is inadequate to provide any relief related to the request to compel further responses to FPIs request for production of documents. Specifically, the notice of motion does not provide any statement placing responding party on notice of the nature of the request, as FPIs request for different document formats is not described in the notice, and only appears in the separate statement. This not only violates the requirement in California Rules of Court, Rules 3.1110 and 3.1112 to provide the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order and the basis for the motion and the relief sought, respectively, but basic due process. The party against whom an order may be issued is entitled to adequate notice. Meet and Confer A motion to compel further discovery responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2016.040.) FPI contends that since the second Informal Discovery Conference, FPI has made several efforts to meet and confer with Plaintiffs counsel, but has received no response (Karim Decl., ¶ 19-22.). Boilerplate Objections It is sanctionable conduct to assert boilerplate objections which lack merit. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010, subd. (e); Korea Data Systems Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516.) If an interrogatory is objectionable only in part, the unobjectionable portion should be answered. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220.) Moreover, it is not grounds for objection that the request is ambiguous, unless the request is so ambiguous that responding party cannot in good faith frame an intelligent reply. (Cembrook v. Superior Court, (1961) 56 Cal.2d 423, 430.) The burden is on the responding party to justify its objections in response to a motion to compel. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 355.) FPI argues that a majority, if not all, of Plaintiffs responses contain a set of meritless boilerplate objections. Such objections are improper in that they lack any specificity. Under California law, objections must be specific (Korea Data Systems Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1516.). Plaintiffs have failed to provide any justification for the objections. Interrogatories Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. & If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible. & If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party. (Code Civ Proc. § 2030.220.) A propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses to interrogatories if any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; or (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300, subd. (a).) When responding to interrogatories, the answering party owes a duty to respond in good faith as best it can. (Deyo v. Kilbourne, (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.) A party has a duty to answer the interrogatories as completely and straightforwardly as possible given the information available to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220.) The duty to truthfully and fully respond has been described as follows: Parties must state the trust, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in answering written interrogatories. (Guzman v. General Motors Corp., (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 438, 442 (internal quotations and citations omitted).) Special Interrogatories Nos. 5, 24, 36, 39, 43, 46, 52, 55, 58, 61, 64, 67, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82, and 85 Interrogatory 5 requests the identities of anyone else living with Plaintiffs while they lived at the property. Interrogatory 24 requests information about Plaintiffs contention that members of the household suffered from the chemical sprays used to treat the unit for bedbugs. Interrogatories 36, 39, 43, 52, 55, 79, and 82 request information about Plaintiffs contention that FPI did not adequately operate the building to protect its tenants from bedbug exposure. Interrogatory 46 requests information about Plaintiffs contention that FPI has a pattern and culture of extreme indifference and reckless disregard for human life Interrogatories 58, 61, 64, and 67 request information about Plaintiffs contention that FPI and its agents acted with intent to harm them. Interrogatories 70, 73, and 76 request information about Plaintiffs contention that FPIs agents owed them a duty of reasonable care. Interrogatory 85 requests information about Plaintiffs contention that they suffered emotional distress. FPI argues that all of Plaintiffs responses to the above include boilerplate objections, including attorney-client privilege, expert opinion, and a right to privacy. FPI also argues that Plaintiffs do not directly address the interrogatories in their responses. Plaintiffs have not filed any Opposition to the motion. Upon review, the Court agrees that the responses do not recite facts, but rather cut and paste the same general conclusions as to liability for various failures. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion to compel further responses to the Special Interrogatories. Requests for Admission With regard to requests for admissions, the only proper responses are to 1) admit, 2) deny, or 3) state that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220.) Where any portion of the request is true the party to whom it is directed must admit that portion: Each answer shall & [a]dmit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.220, subd. (b)(1).) Whether an admission is admitted to or denied, the admission or denial must be as complete and straightforward as the information available reasonably permits. (CCP. § 2033.220, subds. (a), (b)(1).) Requests for Admission Nos. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 Requests for Admission 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 ask Plaintiffs to admit that in December 2020 they were served with various notices to enter the unit for pest control treatment and refused to allow access. Request for Admission 26 asks Plaintiffs to admit they did not request any pest control treatment between December 31, 3020 and February 22, 2021. Requests for Admission 27, 28, 29, and 30 ask Plaintiffs to admit that in February 2021 he was served with notice to enter the unit for pest control treatment and refused to allow access. Plaintiffs responds that the requests are unintelligible and that they do not recall. FPI argues that Plaintiffs response includes boilerplate objections, including attorney-client privilege and expert opinion. FPI also argues that Plaintiff does not state that a reasonable inquiry was made as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220. Plaintiffs have not filed any Opposition to the motion. Upon review, the Court agrees that the responses to requests for admission do not comply with the requirements of the Code. If Plaintiffs cannot recall, that does not render the request unintelligible. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion to compel further responses to the Requests for Admission. Requests for Production of Documents Parties must provide electronically stored information (ESI) in usable form. (CCP. § 2031.280, subd. (e).) If necessary, the responding party at the reasonable expense of the demanding part shall, through detection devices, translate any date compilations included in the demand into reasonable usable form. (CCP. § 2031.280, subd. (e).) In FPIs Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Separate Statement, it contends that Plaintiffs produced documents in improper format. (See e.g., Memo. Points and Auths., Manuel Vasquez pp. 6-7.) However, FPI does not mention the request for different document formats in the notice of motion. Thus, FPI has not provided proper notice of the request. Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to compel further responses to the Document Requests. Sanctions FPI seeks sanctions against Plaintiffs for the work done on all these motions, as well as the previous motion as to the mother, Mariela Vasquez, in the amount of $5,900. (Karim Dec., ¶¶ 23, 24.) While it is a little unclear whether this is requested per motion, or for all five motions combined, the Court construes this request as being combined for the work on all five motions. Under California Code of Civil Procedure Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010), the court must impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to a demand [or interrogatories], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (d).) The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subd. (a).) As these motions was not opposed by Plaintiffs, and the Court grants each motion as to two of the three discovery devices raised by the motion, the Court finds that sanctions are appropriate. FPI seeks sanctions in the amount of $5,900 for the work done on this and the other four motions involving the other plaintiffs. This Court previously awarded $1,770 in sanctions for the motion to compel further discovery responses from Marisela Vasquez. (Min. Order, Aug. 19, 2024.) Thus, the Court will grant sanctions in the amount of $4,130 total for the remaining four motions. Conclusion The Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses from Manuel Vasquez, by and through his Guardian ad litem Marisela Vasquez, and Request for Sanctions is GRANTED as it relates to special interrogatories and requests for admission. The motion is DENIED as to the request for production of documents. The Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses from Luna Vasquez, by and through her Guardian ad litem Marisela Vasquez, and Request for Sanctions is GRANTED as it relates to special interrogatories and requests for admission. The motion is DENIED as to the request for production of documents. The Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses from Anthony Ixta, by and through his Guardian ad litem Marisela Vasquez, and Request for Sanctions is GRANTED as it relates to special interrogatories and requests for admission. The motion is DENIED as to the request for production of documents. The Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses from Anabelle Ixta, by and through her Guardian ad litem Marisela Vasquez, and Request for Sanctions is GRANTED as it relates to special interrogatories and requests for admission. The motion is DENIED as to the request for production of documents. Further responses shall be due within 30 days. The request for sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $4,130 as against Plaintiffs and their counsel, which are also payable within 30 days.

Ruling

Remedy Renae Howard vs. Carmen Williams et al

Aug 29, 2024 |CU23-04463

CU23-044631. Plaintiff’s motion compelling carmen williams to appear for deposition and forsanctionsTENTATIVE RULINGPlaintiff’s motion is granted. Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that notices ofdeposition were properly served on two occasions; that no objections to the notice wereserved; that no motion to quash the deposition notice was filed and served; and that norequest to continue the deposition was made in a timely fashion other than two separateemails as follows: For the deposition notice served January 8, 2024 (deposition dateFebruary 13, 2024), no response was received from defendants’ counsel until February8, 2024, only five days before the noticed deposition, and that was an email fromdefendants’ counsel indicating he was unavailable on February 13, 2024. (Plaintiff’sMotion, Exhibit B.) For the deposition notice served April 18, 2024 (deposition dateJune 14, 2024), no response was received from defendants’ counsel until June 11,2024, only three days before the noticed deposition, and that was an email fromdefendants’ counsel stating: “I have not been able to arrange this. you need toreschedule, with options. I need to depose your client at the same time. Await proposedtimes.” [sic].Defendants failed to file an opposition to the motion; instead, filing a document entitled“Defendants Carmen Williams, and Just Like Home Childcare Inc. Respond to Plaintiff’sMotion for Sanctions.” However, this document actually opposed both plaintiff’s motionsto compel the deposition of defendant Williams and the motion to compel the depositionof the person most qualified of defendant Just Like Home Childcare Inc. as well as therequests for sanctions in each motion. This document was filed August 26, 2024 andserved apparently via facsimile on the same date. To be considered a timely oppositionto either motion, defendants’ opposition should have been filed and served nine courtdays before the hearing, or August 16, 2024. [Code Civ. Proc. §1005(b).] Defendants’“opposition” was filed 10 days late. No request for leave of court to file a late oppositionwas made or granted; and no explanation was provided for the late filing. Therefore,the Court declines to consider this filing. [CRC 3.1300(d).]Carmen Williams is hereby ordered to attend her deposition on a date selected byplaintiff’s counsel within the next ten days. Carmen Williams is ordered to produce,without objection, all documents requested in the deposition notice, at the deposition.Sanctions are addressed at the end of the Tentative Ruling.2. Plaintiff’s motion to compel responses to form interrogatories and forsanctionsTENTATIVE RULING Page 2 of 3Plaintiff’s motion is granted. Full and complete verified responses without objectionsshall be served within twenty days of the date of service of the order.Sanctions are addressed at the end of the Tentative Ruling.3. Plaintiff’s motion to compel deposition of person most knowledgeable re justlike home childcare, inc. And for sanctionsTENTATIVE RULINGPlaintiff’s motion is granted. It is unclear to the Court if defendant Carmen Williams isthe Person Most Knowledgeable regarding the Matters for Examination set forth inplaintiff’s deposition notice. Whether Williams is the proper person for the PMKdeposition, or someone else, the deponent is hereby ordered to attend her depositionon a date selected by plaintiff’s counsel within the next ten days. The persondesignated most knowledgeable is ordered to produce, without objection, all documentsrequested in the deposition notice, at the deposition. If it is determined that Williams isthe PMK, she shall only sit for one deposition, limited to seven hours in length. [CodeCiv. Proc. §2025.290(a).]SANCTIONSSanctions are imposed against defendants and their attorney of record, Timothy J.Walsh, in the amount of $4,500.00, and are due and payable to plaintiff’s counsel withintwenty days of the date of service of the order.______________________________________________________________________ Page 3 of 3

Ruling

JIANNA ELIZABETH FUENTES, ET AL. VS NICOLAS ELIAS VALLE, ET AL.

Aug 29, 2024 |23PSCV02608

Case Number: 23PSCV02608 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 6 CASE NAME: Jianna Elizabeth Fuentes, et al. v. Nicolas Elias Valle, et al. 1 - Claimant Eden Lomas Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Minor or Person with a Disability; 2 - Claimant Emerie Lomas Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Minor or Person with a Disability; and 3 - Claimant Emma Fuentes Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Minor or Person with a Disability TENTATIVE RULING The Court DENIES Claimant Eden Lomas petition for approval of compromise of claim or action or disposition of proceeds of judgment for minor or person with a disability without prejudice. The Court DENIES Claimant Emerie Lomas petition for approval of compromise of claim or action or disposition of proceeds of judgment for minor or person with a disability without prejudice. The Court DENIES Claimant Emma Fuentes petition for approval of compromise of claim or action or disposition of proceeds of judgment for minor or person with a disability without prejudice. Petitioner is ordered to provide notice of the Courts ruling and file proof of service of same within five days of the Courts order. BACKGROUND This is an auto accident case. On August 24, 2023, plaintiffs Jianna Elizabeth Fuentes (Petitioner), minor Eden Lomas (Eden), minor Emerie Lomas (Emerie), and minor Emma Fuentes (Emma) (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against defendants Nicolas Elias Valle (Defendant), Joseph Adam Pedroza,[1] and Does 1 through 50, alleging causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence. On May 21, 2024, the Court approved Petitioners applications and orders for appointment as guardian ad litem for Eden, Emerie, and Emma (collectively, Claimants). On June 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement. On August 15, 2024, Petitioner filed petitions for approval of compromise of claim or action or disposition of proceeds of judgment for minor or person with disability on behalf of Claimants. The petitions are unopposed. LEGAL STANDARD Court approval is required for all settlements of a minor's claim or that of a person lacking the capacity to make decisions. (Prob. Code, §§ 2504, 3500, 3600 et seq.; Code Civ. Proc., § 372; see Pearson v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1337.) "[T]he protective role the court generally assumes in cases involving minors, [is] a role to assure that whatever is done is in the minor's best interests . . . . [I]ts primary concern is whether the compromise is sufficient to provide for the minor's injuries, care and treatment." (Goldberg v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1382.) A petition for court approval of a compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 372 must comply with California Rules of Court Rules 7.950, 7.951, and 7.952. The petition must be verified by the petitioner and contain a full disclosure of all information that has "any bearing upon the reasonableness" of the compromise or the covenant. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950.) The person compromising the claim on behalf of minor, and the represented person, must attend the hearing on compromise of the claim unless the court for good cause dispenses with their personal appearance. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.952(a).) An order for deposit of funds of a minor or person lacking decision-making capacity and a petition for the withdrawal of such funds must comply with California Rules of Court Rules 7.953 and 7.954. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1384; see also Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, rules 4.115-4.118.) DISCUSSION Form MC-350 (Rev. January 1, 2021) The petitions have been verified by Petitioner and presented on a fully completed mandatory Judicial Council Form MC-350, using the current January 1, 2021 revision. (Cal. Rule of Court Rule 7.950.) Settlement Claimants agree to settle their respective claims with Defendant in exchange for $8,000.00 each, $3,250.00 of which will go to each Claimant. If approved, $2,000.00 will be paid in attorneys fees, and $2,750.00 will paid to Wellness Involved Chiropractic, leaving a balance of $3,250.00 for each Claimant, to be transferred to a custodian for the benefit of Claimants under the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. Court approval is required for all settlements of a minor. (Probate Code, §§ 3600, et seq.; Code Civ. Proc., § 372.) The Court has reviewed the proposed settlement and finds the Petitions do not contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the settlement amount to Claimants, as paragraph 10 of the Petitions is incomplete, and only indicates that Defendant will pay $8,000.00. (See Petitions, ¶ 10.) $8,000.00 seems reasonable given Claimants injuries, but Petitioner needs to properly complete the Petitions. The Court also notes that paragraph 11.b.(5) is incomplete as the names and amounts listed total only $56,000, not the $64,000 total amount offered by Defendant. (See Petitions, ¶11.) Attorney Fees The retained attorney's information has been disclosed as required by Rule of Court 7.951. (Petitions, ¶ 17, subd. (b).) There is an agreement for services provided in connection with the underlying claim. (Petition, ¶ 17, subd. (a)(2).) Copies of the agreements were submitted with the Petitions as required by Rule 7.951, subdivision (6), of the California Rules of Court. (Teroganesyan Decls., Ex. A; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.951, subd. (6).) Claimants counsel is seeking to recover $2,000.00 in attorney fees from each Claimant, i.e., 25% of $8,000.00. (Petitions, ¶ 13, subd. (a); Teroganesyan Decls., ¶ 4, Ex. A.) Counsel has provided a declaration addressing the reasonableness of the fee request, as required by Rule 7.955, subdivision (c), of the California Rules of Court, accounting for the factors specified in Rule 7.955, subdivision (b). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.955, subd. (c).) Rule 7.955, subdivision (b), provides: (b) Factors the court may consider in determining a reasonable attorney's fee. In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court may consider the following nonexclusive factors: (1) The fact that a minor or person with a disability is involved and the circ*mstances of that minor or person with a disability. (2) The amount of the fee in proportion to the value of the services performed. (3) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill required to perform the legal services properly. (4) The amount involved and the results obtained. (5) The time limitations or constraints imposed by the representative of the minor or person with a disability or by the circ*mstances. (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship between the attorney and the representative of the minor or person with a disability. (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or attorneys performing the legal services. (8) The time and labor required. (9) The informed consent of the representative of the minor or person with a disability to the fee. (10) The relative sophistication of the attorney and the representative of the minor or person with a disability. (11) The likelihood, if apparent to the representative of the minor or person with a disability when the representation agreement was made, that the attorney's acceptance of the particular employment would preclude other employment. (12) Whether the fee is fixed, hourly, or contingent. (13) If the fee is contingent: (A) The risk of loss borne by the attorney; (B) The amount of costs advanced by the attorney; and (C) The delay in payment of fees and reimbursem*nt of costs paid by the attorney. (14) Statutory requirements for representation agreements applicable to particular cases or claims. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.955, subd. (b).) The Court addresses these factors below. Amount of Fee in Proportion to Value of Services Performed Claimants counsel indicates that the contingency rate for each of the Claimants in this matter is 25%, and claims to have represented Claimants zealously in the prelitigation and litigation phases of this action. (Teroganesyan Decls., ¶¶ 4, 9.) Novelty and Difficulty Claimants counsel provides no information about the novelty or difficulty of this case. The Court infers from the Petitions and attached medical bills that this case was neither novel nor particularly difficult. (See Petitions, Attachment.) Amount Involved and Results Obtained Claimants counsel only mentions a 25% contingency and does not mention the actual dollar amount involved or the results obtained. (See Teroganesyan Decls., ¶ 4.) Nature and Length of Professional Relationship Claimants counsel has been representing Claimants in this action since November of 2021. (Teroganesyan Decls., ¶ 2, Ex. A.) Experience, Reputation, and Ability of Counsel Claimants counsel states that she has extensive experience representing Plaintiffs in personal injury cases. (Teroganesyan Decls., ¶ 8.) Time and Labor Required Claimants counsel provides no information about the amount of work undertaken for this case. Acceptance of Case Precluding Other Employment Claimants counsel does not address whether acceptance of this case precluded other employment. Contingent Fee Claimants counsel accepted Claimants case for a 25% contingency fee. (Teroganesyan Decls., ¶ 4, Ex. A.) Claimants counsel offered to advance the costs associated with this action, and otherwise does not request reimbursem*nt for any costs. (Teroganesyan Decls., ¶ 5; Petitions, ¶ 13, subd. (b).) The Court finds that Claimants counsel has adequately demonstrated the reasonableness of the fee award in light of the factors and circ*mstances in this case. Medical Bills Claimants have each incurred $4,091.50 in medical expenses, but Wellness Evolved Chiropractic has agreed to reduce its liens to $2,750.00 each. (Petitions, ¶ 12, subd. (b)(5); Id., Attachment, p. 23 of pdf.) Costs Claimants counsel is not seeking to recover costs. (Petitions, ¶ 13, subd. (b).) Amount to Be Paid to Claimant The net amount to be paid to each of the Claimants is $3,250.00. (Petitions, ¶ 15.) Disposition of Balance of Proceeds Petitioner requests that the net proceeds, $3,250.00 for each Claimant, be transferred to a custodian for the benefit of the minor under the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. (Petitions, ¶ 18, subd. (b)(6).) Petitioner did not provide the name and address of the proposed custodian and the money or other property to be transferred on Attachment 18b(6), as directed in the Petitions. (Id.) The Court needs more information on this, considering that it appears Petitioner is seeking to have the money made payable to her. (Proposed Orders, ¶ 8, subd. (b)(2).) Court Appearance Rule 7.952, subdivision (a), of the California Rules of Court requires attendance by the petitioner and claimant unless the court for good cause dispenses with their personal appearance. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.952, subd. (a).) The Court finds that the appearances of the Claimants are not required due to their minor status. However, the petitioners attendance is required. Prognosis Claimants have recovered completely from the effects of their injuries. (Petitions, ¶ 8, subd. (a).) Proposed Order MC-351 Petitioner has filed a Proposed Order Form MC-351 for each of the Claimants. Incomplete Forms The Court also notes that although the Court approved Petitioners applications and orders for appointment as guardian ad litem for Claimants, Petitioner did not mark the box for guardian ad litem on the Petitions. (See Petitions, ¶ 1.) Petitioner also did not mark the same box on the proposed orders. (See Proposed Orders, ¶ 2.) The Court further notes that Petitioner did not provide the judicial officers name on paragraph 1, subdivision (c), of the proposed orders. (See Proposed Orders, ¶ 1, subd. (c).) Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES the Claimants petitions for approval of compromise of claim or action or disposition of proceeds of judgment for minor or person with a disability without prejudice. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES Claimant Eden Lomas petition for approval of compromise of claim or action or disposition of proceeds of judgment for minor or person with a disability without prejudice. The Court DENIES Claimant Emerie Lomas petition for approval of compromise of claim or action or disposition of proceeds of judgment for minor or person with a disability without prejudice. The Court DENIES Claimant Emma Fuentes petition for approval of compromise of claim or action or disposition of proceeds of judgment for minor or person with a disability without prejudice. Petitioner is ordered to provide notice of the Courts ruling and file proof of service of same within five days of the Courts order. [1] Defendant Pedroza appears to be named only and not served.

Ruling

LIVIER AGUILAR, AN INDIVIDUAL VS CARLOS HUERTA, AN INDIVIDUAL, ET AL.

Aug 29, 2024 |24PSCV01099

Case Number: 24PSCV01099 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: O Tentative Ruling DEFENDANTS, LDI MECHANICAL INC. AND CARLOS HUERTAS NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR COMPLETE CONSOLIDATION OF CASES 22PSCV01733, 24PSCV01045 AND 24PSCV01099 HEARD ON JULY 1, 2024 is GRANTED.[1] Background This case arises from a motor vehicle accident that happened on 4/25/2022. On November 8, 2022, Plaintiff Natasha Khoj Shikari filed her action against Defendants LDI Mechanical Inc.; Carlos Huerta for (1) motor vehicle. On December 7, 2022, Defendants each filed their respective answers. On April 15, 2024, the court issued its ruling re: Notice of Related case and found that that the following cases, 22PSCV01733 and 24PSCV01045, are related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a). 22PSCV01733 is the lead case. On May 29, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion. On June 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion. According to the motion, Plaintiff requests that the Motion to Consolidate be granted in its entirety. (Motion p. 2:1-2.) On July 1, 2024, the court held its hearing in the 22PSCV01733 case wherein Defendants, LDI Mechanical Inc. and Carlos Huerta's Notice of Motion and Motion for Complete Consolidation of Cases 22PSCV01733, 24PSCV01045, and 24PSCV01099 is GRANTED; effective upon filing the motion in case number 24PSCV01099. On August 7, 2024, the instant motion was filed in case 24PSCV01099. Discussion As indicated in the courts ruling issued in the 22PSCV01733 case, the three actions are based on the same car accident that happened on April 5, 2022, past the intersection of Fairplex Drive and Avalon Avenue in Pomona, California wherein Defendant Huertas vehicle impacted Plaintiff Shikaris vehicle. Plaintiff Shikaris vehicle then impacted Plaintiff Angel Gonzalezs vehicle, and Plaintiff Angel Gonzalezs vehicle struck Plaintiff Aguilars vehicle. With the same or overlapping issues (based in negligence), the actions should be consolidated and disposed of as a single proceeding. (Motion p. 7, citing Spector v. Superior Court of San Mateo County (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 839, 844.) The only defect was that the motion was not filed in case No. 24PSCV01099 such that the court ruled that the motion to consolidate would be granted effective upon filing the motion in case 24PSCV01099. Now that the motion was also filed in case 24PSCV01099, the motion is granted. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the court enters an order consolidating for all purposes, including trial, Case No. 22PSCV01733, Case No. 24PSCV01045 and Case No. 24PSCV01099, with Case No. 22PSCV01733 as the designated lead case in this action. [1] A proposed order has been filed.

Ruling

Sep 09, 2024 |S-CV-0052078

S-CV-0052078 Myers, Roger et al vs. Fielder, Fielder & Fielder et al** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouragedAppearance required.

Ruling

- YOUNG, BRANDON vs KESSLER, BRAD a)

Aug 26, 2024 |CV-20-002850

CV-20-002850 - YOUNG, BRANDON vs KESSLER, BRAD – a) Defendant/ Cross-Defendant Fit for Life, LLC’s Motion to Bifurcate Trial - DENIED; b) Defendant/ Cross-Defendant Fit for Life's Motion to Continue Trial, Continue all Discovery, Motion Expert Designation Dates, and all Other Related Dates, Pursuant to the New Trial Date – DENIED.a) The Court finds that bifurcation is unlikely to be conducive to expedition and economy in this instance, due to the likelihood of duplication of evidence on the issue of damages.b) The Court finds that Defendant has failed to demonstrate good cause for a continuance under the circ*mstances.

Ruling

TENG JIAO ZHOU, ET AL. VS NORTH EL MONTE AUTOMOTIVE, ET AL.

Aug 27, 2024 |24PSCV01179

Case Number: 24PSCV01179 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: O Tentative Ruling (1) Plaintiffs Demurrer to the Cross-Complaint is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. (2) PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF CROSS-COMPLAINANTS COMPLAINT is MOOT in part (i.e., punitive damages) and DENIED in part (untimeliness). Background This is a negligence case. Plaintiffs TENG JIAO ZHOU (Zhou) and Yung Wu (Wu) allege the following against Defendants NORTH EL MONTE AUTOMOTIVE, business form unknown, and HANK JANN, an individual and JENNIFER JANN, as an individual and as TRUSTEE OF THE ELDAN JANN AND JENNIFER JANN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, and ELDAN JANN, as an individual and as TRUSTEE OF THE ELDAN JANN AND JENNIFER JANN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST: Defendants hired Zhou to do repairs on the roof of a premises owned by Defendants; Zhou was not licensed nor is he a licensed contractor. On the second day of the job, Zhou fell off the latter. Zhou alleges that because he was unlicensed, he is deemed an employee of the Defendants for civil tort purposes. On April 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed suit for: 1. Negligence 2. Premises Liability 3. Loss of Consortium (Wu is Zhous wife)

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